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In July 2012, the Malaysian government introduced 
section 114A of the Evidence Act 1950 (114A). The new 
law provides for the presumption of fact in publication 
in order to facilitate the identification and prove of the 
identity of an anonymous person involved in publication 
through the internet:
Presumption of fact in publication
114A. (1) A person whose name, photograph or 
pseudonym appears on any publication depicting 
himself as the owner, host, administrator, editor 
or sub-editor, or who in any manner facilitates to 
publish or re-publish the publication is presumed to 
have published or re-published the contents of the 
publication unless the contrary is proved.
(2) A person who is registered with a network service 
provider as a subscriber of a network service on which 
any publication originates from is presumed to be the 
person who published or re-published the publication 
unless the contrary is proved.
(3) Any person who has in his custody or control 
any computer on which any publication originates 
from is presumed to have published or re-published 
the content of the publication unless the contrary is 
proved.
This new law sparked a massive on-line protest, dubbed 
the ‘Malaysia Internet Black Out Day’ and also ‘Stop114A’ 
campaign. Protesters replaced their Facebook and Twitter 
profile picture with the Stop114A banner, and web site 
operators displayed the Stop114A banner on their web 
sites. Within two days, the Stop114A Facebook web site 
(https://www.facebook.com/evidenceamendmentact) 
gained 43,000 members from 400 members. It is probably 
one of Malaysia’s most successful on-line campaigns.
Section 114A 
Prior to the introduction of section 114A, the prosecution 
faced a difficult task to prove that an accused is the 
publisher of certain content. This can be seen in the 
cases of PP v Muslim bin Ahmad [2013] 1 AMR 436 and 
PP v Rutinin Bin Suhaimin [2013] 2 CLJ 427, where both 
accused had been charged under section 233 of the 
Malaysia Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 for 
allegedly posting offensive comments on the Sultan of 
Perak’s web site. Both men alleged that they did not 
post the comments, notwithstanding that their internet 
protocol addresses pointed to them.
In Rutinin’s case, the investigators detected the Media 
Access Control (MAC) address of the computer that 
was used for the internet session in question when the 
offensive remark was posted. The MAC address is the 
unique address that is given to a hardware device by the 
manufacturer. The particular MAC address matched the 
MAC address that was captured by the internet service 
provider’s servers during the internet session in question 
when the offensive remark was posted. The prosecution 
allegation was based on the circumstantial evidence 
that the computer with the MAC address that was used 
to make the posting in question was found in the shop 
of the accused, and the fact that the internet account 
belonged to the accused himself. Given this evidence, the 
prosecution submitted that the accused must have posted 
the offensive remark in question.
In Muslim bin Ahmad’s case, one of the accused’s 
witnesses, claiming to be an expert witness, testified 
that e-mail spoofing had taken place. However, he did 
not carry out an analysis of the exhibits or the server in 
this instance, and apart from merely stating that e-mail 
spoofing is possible and showing how it is done, no proof 
was adduced by the witness to show that any e-mail 
spoofing had in fact taken place.
The Sessions Court acquitted Muslim bin Ahmad, and 
Rutinin bin Suhaimin was discharged by the Sessions 
Court without his defence being called. The prosecution 
had apparently failed to show that the persons who 
posted the offensive comments were the accused.
However, the High Court subsequently overturned the 
Sessions Court decisions. Rutinin Bin Suhaimin’s defence 
was called, but the judge held that section 114A is not 
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applicable because the postings were made before the 
enforcement date of section 114A (31 July 2012). However, 
the circumstantial evidence was sufficiently strong to 
conclude that the accused had used the internet account 
that was registered in his name at the material time. 
Muslim Bin Ahmad was handed a fine of RM10,000 for 
each charge and six months’ imprisonment. He requested 
a ‘binding over order’ (released on probation). However, 
the learned judge dismissed the request and warned that 
a binding over order ‘would send the wrong message 
to would be offenders and the public at large that 
offensively uncontrolled and virulent comments can be 
indiscriminately posted on the Internet without any or 
serious repercussions. And that is not a message that this 
court would like to send out.’
Software licence 
In another case, Avnet Azure Sdn Bhd v EACT 
Technologies Sdn Bhd; Sapura Research Sdn Bhd 
(Third Party) (Kuala Lumpur High Court Civil Suit No.D-
22NCC-439-2011) (Unreported), the High Court dealt 
with a case regarding the delivery of a software licence, 
and in particular the admissibility and evidential weight 
of e-mail messages. The plaintiff sued the defendant for 
outstanding fees for the sale and delivery of software and 
licences. The defendant alleged that the software and 
licences were purchased for the third party.
The mode of delivery of the licence is based on 
electronic evidence, namely a ‘server-generated’ e-mail 
message with an attachment which is a document 
described as a ‘Proof of Entitlement’ (POE). There is no 
requirement of any physical delivery in the form of any 
media kit or a box containing a CD. All that is required is 
for the end-user to visit a dedicated web site to obtain the 
‘licence key’ with which it can then download the software 
from the web site.
The plaintiff sought to rely on the server generated 
e-mail message with the attachment (the POE) to show 
that the POE had been delivered to the third party. The 
plaintiff tendered in the course of the trial a certificate 
under section 90A(2) of the Evidence Act 1950 in an 
attempt to persuade the court that once this computer 
evidence is admitted upon production of the certificate, 
the truth of the contents must be held proven. The 
High Court held that reliance on an e-mail without 
the maker being called is highly undesirable and is 
hearsay. However, there could be circumstances when 
its authenticity and veracity can be established by other 
direct and circumstantial evidence.
Facebook and tweets
Recently, the High Court has dealt with two cases relating 
to tweets and Facebook postings. In National Union of 
Bank Employees v Noorzeela Binti Lamin (Kuala Lumpur 
High Court Suit No. S-23-NCVC-14-2011) (Unreported), 
the plaintiff initiated an action against the defendant for 
posting alleged defamatory comments on her Facebook 
page.
The plaintiff’s witness, however, did not personally 
ascertain the identity of the Facebook account’s owner: 
a representative in his office did so. A representative 
from his office had compiled the Facebook pages, and 
the witness claimed to have knowledge of who owned 
the account, because it was shown to him. A Facebook 
page was shown to him and it had the name of the first 
defendant and that of several other people. He knew 
who operated that Facebook account because members 
had confirmed to him that it was the first defendant’s 
account. He admitted that he had not called these 
members as witnesses, thinking that what evidence he 
had was enough. The plaintiff also did not call the person 
who provided the documents containing the Facebook 
comments.
The defendant denied making such comments on 
Facebook, and that his sister operated the Facebook 
account. His sister also testified that ‘maybe someone 
hack[ed] my Facebook [account]’. The defendant further 
contended that the plaintiff had failed to take any steps to 
check the details of the owner of the Facebook account or 
the internet address with the Facebook administrator to 
confirm that the account belonged to the first defendant. 
Notwithstanding this evidence, the defendant admitted 
in her Statement of Defence that she had published the 
comments. As a result, the court held that she was bound 
by her pleadings and therefore could not dispute that she 
did not post the comments.
The High Court was also of the view that the comments 
on the Facebook would point to the defendant being 
the author of them, and the person who published 
the comments. The court found it unbelievable that 
the defendant’s sister would be interested in posting 
comments on the plaintiff.
In Dato Seri Mohammad Nizar Bin Jamaluddin v 
Sistem Televisyen Malaysia & Anor (Kuala Lumpur High 
Court Suit No: 23 NCvC-84-07/2012) (Unreported), the 
plaintiff, a well-known politician, filed an action against 
the defendants for defaming him through the first 
defendant’s television news report of materials regarding 
the plaintiff’s tweets on in his Twitter account.
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The plaintiff alleged that the news report wrongly 
accused him of making the allegation that the Sultan of 
Johor had used public funds to bid for car plate number 
WWW1. The defendants contended that the plaintiff did, 
in his tweet messages, launch the criticism against the 
Sultan of Johor for having indulged in the extravagance of 
bidding RM520,000.00 for the number plate.
The High Court held that plaintiff’s tweet messages, 
read and understood by any reasonable man, clearly 
insinuated that the Sultan of Johore had used public 
funds for the WWW1 bid. Thus, the court held that 
the defendants succeeded in their defence based on 
justification. However, the court held that the defendants 
did not practise responsible journalism, because they 
failed to verify the truth of his tweet messages with the 
plaintiff, or to obtain his comments on the matter. The 
defendants’ publication was lop-sided, leaning towards 
giving a negative impression about the plaintiff, even 
before the police completed their investigations. The 
court also stated that there should be freedom on the part 
of the plaintiff to tweet his personal messages in his own 
Twitter account for as long as the laws on defamation and 
sedition and other laws of the land are not breached.
Closing 
In early 2013 alone, numerous netizens were investigated 
or arrested for their alleged unlawful postings. Two 
bloggers were arrested for allegedly inciting hatred and 
causing chaos on their blogs, and the police questioned a 
lady and her friends for posting Facebook comments that 
allegedly insulted the Malaysian King. The authorities 
have also arrested the operator of a media piracy site, 
which hosted links to illegal copies of music, TV shows 
and movies. Police reports have also been made against 
two Facebook users who had allegedly insulted the 
Prophet Muhammad. It will be interesting to see how the 
courts deal with evidence obtained from the internet in 
the future.
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